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Abstract 
Runway incursions pose a significant threat to 
the continued safety of commercial aviation. In 
response, the Runway Collision Avoidance 
Function (RCAF) was developed by the 
University of Malta and evaluated at Cranfield 
University as part of the European Programme 
FLYSAFE. This paper discusses the design of 
experiment developed in preparation of the said 
evaluations, addressing the objectives of the test 
programme and explains how these objectives 
were met.
1 Introduction
Despite several attempts at mitigating the threat
of runway incursion through improvements in 
airport equipment and procedures, the industry 
still has no globally effective solution to the 
problem.  Consequently, the elimination of the 
hazard of runway incursion is still listed as one 
of the most wanted items by the NTSB [1].
The model of accident causation proposed by 
James Reason [2] suggests that accidents occur 
as a result of a sequence of events; therefore 
measures should be taken to mitigate the risks at 
all stages.  In response to the need to mitigate 
the risk of runway collision, various approaches
have been considered to date.  Amongst these 
are methods that alert the air traffic control 
officer (ATCO) and others that alert the flight 
crew directly.  The authors are of the opinion
that runway conflicts are best mitigated with 
direct alerting on the flight deck. The rationale 
for this essentially lies in the fact that it is the 
pilot who needs to take corrective or evasive 
action to avoid a conflict and alerting the ATCO 
would introduce an unnecessary delay to allow
the relay of the alert to the pilot.  Therefore, the
Runway Collision Avoidance Function (RCAF)
was designed by the University of Malta under 
the European Programme FLYSAFE as an 
airborne alerting system to directly alert the 
crew of a conflict.  
Different strategies of alerting exist.  Of major
relevance to runway conflict alerting is the issue 
of whether the alert should be ‘informative’ or 
‘directive’.  Informative alerts provide only 
information pertaining to the situation, whilst 
directive alerts contain information pertaining to 
the action that is required.  Directive alerts have 
significant advantages over informative alerts in 
situations that need immediate reaction such as 
those of runway conflicts.  This is because 
directive alerts reduce the reaction time by 
eliminating the mental processes where the pilot 
has to identify the alert, become situationally 
aware and then decide on the most appropriate 
course of action.  Furthermore, all these steps 
introduce opportunity for human error and these 
are eliminated through the directive alerting 
approach.  As a result, the RCAF was designed 
to generate directive alerts.
However, it is known that crews may prefer to 
take decisions themselves in certain situations.  
This includes runway conflict events, where it 
may be argued that it is pilots who should 
decide on the best course of action.  A separate 
school of thought that was adopted in the 
development of the RCAF is that it is not 
possible for pilots to reliably determine the best 
course of action in demanding circumstances.
In essence, the RCAF is a safety-net function 
that provides an additional barrier to mitigate 
the risk of runway collisions. It provides 
surveillance of traffic movements within and in 
the vicinity of the runway and determines 
Design of Experiment for the Pilot Evaluation of an 
Airborne Runway Incursion Alerting System
S. Szasz*, J. Gauci*, D. Zammit-Mangion*, B. Zammit**, A. Sammut**, D. Harris*
*Cranfield University, **University of Malta
Keywords: runway incursion, alerting system, pilot evaluation, collision avoidance
S. Szasz, J. Gauci, D. Zammit-Mangion, B. Zammit, A. Sammut, D. Harris
2
whether a conflict exits, generating timely alerts 
in the event of the risk of a collision. Directive 
alerts are provided on the flight deck using both 
the aural and visual channels.
The RCAF can be used in conjunction with 
other systems providing information pertaining 
to a runway conflict, such as a moving map 
showing the ownship position with respect to 
airport geographical layout and other traffic.  
This display would typically be presented on the 
cockpit’s Navigational Display (ND).  Such a 
system can provide visual information 
pertaining to the conflict that is independent of 
the RCAF and its alerting strategy.
Take-off and landing are two manoeuvres in 
which pilot workload is high and there is little 
time for reaction if an anomalous event occurs.  
Consequently, the effectiveness of an alerting 
system on the flight deck depends not only on 
the reliability of the alerts (that is, the reliability 
of the electronic system) but also on the design 
of the Human Machine Interface (HMI). These 
design considerations include alerting 
philosophy, timeliness of the alert, quantity and 
method of information transfer and the visual 
and aural component balance, amongst others. 
To this effect, the alerting strategy adopted for 
the RCAF was tested through a series of pilot 
evaluations carried out at Cranfield University. 
This paper discusses the experiment design 
process in detail and is organised as follows:
Section 2 explains the scope of the evaluation; 
Section 3 discusses the evaluation technique 
that was adopted and highlights some of the 
issues that were taken into account; Section 4 
describes the simulator setup and Section 5 
discusses the scenarios that were designed to 
test the RCAF; Section 6 describes the contents 
of the actual evaluation in chronological order 
and Section 7 presents the main conclusions.
2 Scope of Evaluation
The first step in the experiment design process 
was to clearly define the scope of the 
evaluation. Broadly, the evaluation was used to 
overall qualify the RCAF to a Technology 
Readiness Level (TRL) of 4. 
In any system design, the user interface 
implications must also be considered and, in 
particular, it has been identified that new 
technologies and functional capability should 
only be introduced if they result in an 
operational advantage with no adverse effects
[3]. In the phases of flight where the RCAF is 
applicable – primarily in take-off and landing –
workload on the flight deck is already high.
Therefore, it is vital that any new system does 
not detract the flight crew’s attention from 
existing systems and responsibilities.  
During take-off and landing, pilots are 
essentially required to scan several instruments 
and to maintain visual contact with the runway
whilst controlling the aircraft.  They also have 
to coordinate with air traffic control, keep a 
mental picture of the traffic situation around 
them (aided by monitoring voice radio 
communications) and monitor other systems to 
ensure the aircraft is capable of carrying out the 
manoeuvre. This essentially requires the crew 
to perform multiple tasks simultaneously.  Such 
tasks clearly utilise the pilot’s visual and mental 
resources. Multiple Resource Theory (MRT) 
provides an understanding of human 
performance limitations when attending to 
multiple tasks performed simultaneously and 
helps to design a system accordingly [4].  It 
identifies that an individual has a limited 
capacity for completing tasks, which can either 
be used to attend to one task or shared between 
tasks that do not compete with each other for 
processing resources at the different stages.   
Visual and spatial information, such as the 
position of the aircraft on the approach, 
occupies working memory’s visual resources in 
the form of a spatial code.  Consequently, a
visual warning at this stage may be in direct 
conflict with the existing tasks, as these 
information processing resources are already 
occupied.  Therefore, one or all the visual tasks 
involved may suffer from degradation in 
performance when the human brain is further 
loaded with visual tasks. However, introducing 
information through the auditory channel, such 
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as, for example, using a verbal auditory 
warning, would not be in conflict with the 
information processing taking place. This is 
because the pilot will be able to maintain visual 
contact with the runway whilst simultaneously 
listening to the verbal alert.  For this reason, the 
use of an auditory warning in a situation of high 
visual demand is normally preferable. 
Consequently, a primary aim of the evaluation 
was to assess the effectiveness and acceptability 
of the aural directive alert on the flight deck and 
to compare it with visual and non-directive (or 
informative) modes of alerting.
A second important aim of the evaluation was to 
assess how well the RCAF leads the crew to the 
correct (directed) response and to understand 
why crews reacted in the manner they did in the 
scenarios they were given.  Typically an alert 
informs the operator to a problem and the 
operator is required to respond in an appropriate 
way.  The ultimate aim of the RCAF is to safely 
resolve a runway conflict and, with the pilot in 
the loop, it is important to validate the alerting 
strategy and pilot response together as a single 
step in the conflict resolution process.
A third important aim of the evaluation was to 
assess the response time of the pilot-in-the-loop 
system.  In order to achieve timely response, the 
alert must be detected and the meaning must be 
clear. Detectability is a common problem, 
especially for speech-based auditory alerts, as it 
has been identified that the auditory channel is 
more prone to overload than the visual channel. 
Previous research in the area has highlighted 
that the use of an appropriately designed 
alerting tone is useful to enable the pilot to 
detect the alert in a noisy environment and when 
under high workload [5]. An alerting tone helps 
avoid forward masking as a result of the finite 
time required for attentional switching.  It is 
well known that in stressful situations, aural and 
even visual alerts may be completely missed 
and an aural tone preceding a speech-based 
auditory alert mitigates this risk.  Other 
considerations of the aural tone include 
amplitude assessment to ensure it is not masked 
by environmental noise whilst not being too 
loud to cause a startle reaction, and its
uniqueness so that the meaning of the tone can 
be learnt and the response immediate. 
Another concept considered in the RCAF 
alerting strategy is that of redundancy gains, 
which aims to reduce response time by 
presenting the flight crew with multiple 
presentations of the same information.  This 
technique has been demonstrated to be 
successful in reducing response time [6].  In 
accordance with this theory, a time critical alert 
may wish to combine auditory and visual 
channels to increase the likelihood of the correct 
identification of the problem and help reduce 
response time.  
Accordingly, it was an aim of the experiment to 
assess impact of a preceding auditory tone and 
the use of visual alerts in conjunction with 
speech-based alerts on the response of the crew.
Considering all the design issues, therefore, the 
pilot evaluation of the RCAF focussed on 
determining:
1. The validity, effectiveness and acceptance 
of the directive alerting philosophy on the 
flight deck from a human factors 
perspective.
2. Pilot reaction to the functional behaviour of 
the system in different operating conditions.
3. The impact of preceding auditory tones and 
the use of visual alerts in conjunction with 
speech-based alerts.
4. Strengths and weaknesses of the alerting 
technique and alerting system.
Once the scope was fully defined, the evaluation 
procedure was designed.  This procedure was 
organised in three main sessions, namely the 
pre-evaluation briefing and simulator 
familiarisation session, the simulator session 
and the post-evaluation de-brief (Fig. 1). 
During the actual evaluations, these sessions 
were organised in two consecutive half-days, 
with the first half-day being dedicated to the 
pre-evaluation briefing and simulator 
familiarisation session.  The evaluation 
procedure is addressed in Section 6.
S. Szasz, J. Gauci, D. Zammit-Mangion, B. Zammit, A. Sammut, D. Harris
4
Fig. 1 The evaluation process
3 Evaluation Technique
3.1 Data Collection
The evaluation of the RCAF used both 
qualitative and quantitative data.  Qualitative 
data were used to establish the participants’ 
acceptance of the alerts presented and to 
establish the clarity of the alerts. Quantitative 
data were also obtained to compare the 
efficiency of the proposed evasive manoeuvre 
when executed by the participants. 
3.2 Pilot Study
A pilot study using three participants was 
conducted to ensure the operational procedures 
involved in the use of the RCAF were clear and 
applicable. The participants were taken from 
the same population as that used in the main 
study to ensure validity. As a result of the pilot 
study, several amendments were made to ensure 
the objectives of the evaluation were met.
These included altering the questions asked to 
participants, reducing the length of time each 
participant was needed in the simulator and 
refining some of the scenarios to ensure that 
they were as effective as intended and that a 
broad range of situations were covered. 
3.3 Sample Characteristics
The sample was chosen to comprise of line 
pilots flying single-aisle large transport aircraft 
who held full, fixed-wing Air Transport Pilot’s 
Licences with a multi-engine rating. Pilots with 
a range of experience, ranging from junior first 
officers to senior captains and training captains
were targeted. These pilots were current on 
either the Boeing 737 or Airbus A320.  Such a 
wide sample range not only provided a 
representative sample of the whole population, 
but also supported assessment of considerations 
such as the impact of age group, airframer HMI 
strategy, experience and training background on 
the alerting strategy.  
3.4 Ethical Issues
Participants were given full information 
regarding the aims of the evaluation and how 
the data would be obtained and analysed.  They 
were advised that all information obtained 
would be treated with the strictest confidence 
and that no personal details would appear in the 
final report. Participants were asked to sign an 
informed consent form and given the right to 
withdraw from the research at any time until the 
data were added to the analysis data pool. 
3.5 Independent Variables
In order to assess the impact of the alerting 
philosophy of the RCAF, the alerting unit 
within the function was modified to support 
three HMI output modes, namely:
Mode 1: Standard RCAF alerting (directive 
alerts with introductory tone).  No traffic 
information available on the ND.
Mode 2: Standard RCAF alerting as in Mode 1 
but with the introductory tone removed.  A 
moving map display with traffic overlay was 
made available on the ND.
Mode 3: Informative alerting.  The standard 
RCAF alerts in this mode were replaced by 
informative speech-based auditory alerts.  No 
introductory tone.  The visual display was made 
available on the ND as for Mode 2.
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Participants were asked to complete the 
evaluation scenarios using the RCAF with its 
output set to one of these three modes.
4 Evaluation Environment
4.1 Flight Deck Environment
The evaluations made use of Cranfield 
University’s Large Aircraft Flight Simulator.  
The flight deck environment of this simulator is 
based on a Boeing 747-200 training device. The 
cockpit retains its original configuration, with 
standard control column, seats, central pedestal, 
windows, overhead panel structure and 
panelling.  The flight engineer station has been
replaced by an instructor station, from where the 
simulator and simulated environment are 
controlled.
The cockpit instruments of the original 
simulator have been replaced with LCD 
displays arranged in a five display 
configuration: the Primary Flight Display (PFD)
and Navigation Display (ND) for each pilot and 
a central engines and systems display. The flight 
instrument and navigational display design is 
based on the Boeing 747-400 displays and 
symbology.
The simulator is also equipped with Airbus-
style side-sticks and A320-style flight control 
unit and central pedestal controls for radio 
systems.  This creates a physical environment 
that, whilst being generic and flexible to support 
research activities, is adequately representative 
of a typical large transport aircraft (Fig. 2).
The primary visuals are generated using 
Multigen-Paradigm Vega software running on 
an SGI Onyx II machine.  This drives a SEOS 
display system based on 3 channels with 
collimated optics for critical depth of field 
cueing and excellent cross cockpit viewing.  
The optics afford a 180º horizontal and 40º 
vertical field of view.  These qualities are 
fundamental in the support of the general 
immersive feel required of simulators used for 
such evaluation and research into human factors 
and crew activity on the flight deck.
Fig. 2 The Cranfield simulator
4.2 Simulation Environment
The Cranfield simulator architecture is based on 
a core of four networked computers (PCs)
running the ownship model with an update rate 
of 50Hz and the instructor station (Fig. 3).
These computers communicate with each other 
and with the primary image generator via 
Ethernet using the UDP protocol. The ownship 
model is based on the Boeing 747-200, 
providing the flight characteristics and handling 
qualities representative of the aircraft in 
question. The simulator also simulates several 
navigational aids including VOR, DME, marker 
beacons and ILS using a navigational aid 
database that is representative of the area in 
which the scenarios are set.
The primary image generator contains the visual 
database which represents Bristol Filton Airport 
(EGTG) surrounded by generic landscaping. 
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Fig. 3 Simulation environment
For the scope of the evaluations, the simulator 
was upgraded to provide the following 
functionalities:
 RCAF hosting.  The RCAF needs to 
receive information about the ownship
(such as flight management and air data 
information) and surrounding traffic in the 
form of simulated ADS-B messages.  The 
RCAF also needs to send the auditory 
alerts to the simulator auditory system.  
 Traffic generation and scenario control.  
The traffic generator and scenario control 
units were customised to simulate traffic
movements and to create traffic conflict 
scenarios on the ground.  This is further 
discussed in Section 5.  
 Data logging.  The simulator’s data logger 
was customised to store all of the simulator 
parameters that were required for the 
quantitative analysis that followed.
 Moving map.  A moving map generator
was developed to represent a generic 
moving map displayed on the ND typical 
of products available on the market and 
other research programmes.  This was 
designed to provide the pilots with the 
visual alerts of the conflict scenarios and to 
be used in conjunction with RCAF alerting 
to assess impact of the use of such a 
display as an additional, independent 
information channel.  The graphical 
qualities of the moving map developed 
were not being assessed in the evaluation 
and consequently were not of major 
concern in the implementation of the 
moving map.  
5 Scenario Design
5.1 Conflict Scenarios
A total of 14 scenarios were designed to test 
the RCAF (Table 1). These were chosen to 
simulate runway incursions during four specific
runway manoeuvres: take-off, landing, line-up 
and backtrack.
Two aircraft were involved in each scenario: 
the ‘ownship’ and the ‘target’.  The ownship 
was the aircraft represented by the actual 
simulator in the evaluations and the target was 
the aircraft that was coming in conflict with the 
ownship on the runway, typically causing a 
runway incursion by violating ATC 
instructions.  The ownship was flown manually 
by the volunteer pilots in order to increase 
workload to aid their distraction from the 
knowledge that they were in a simulated 
environment.  Cross-winds and turbulence were 
also added for the same reason.  The target was 
automatically generated and controlled by the 
simulated environment.  Both aircraft broadcast 
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ADS-B messages but only the ownship was
equipped with the RCAF. Other aircraft 
movements were also simulated but only one 
target was selected during the scenarios.  This 
is because it is highly improbable that more 
than one aircraft would cause a runway 
incursion to the ownship at the same time. 
The RCAF is a safety barrier aimed at 
providing protection where current procedures 
and systems fail.  Consequently, it is expected 
that it will be most effective in low visibility 
conditions, where the crew of the ownship 
would be otherwise unaware of the traffic 
conflict situation that will be developing.  For 
this reason, the majority of the scenarios were 
designed to be conducted in low visibility.
This ensured that the crew did not have visual 
contact with the target aircraft before the 
incursion occurred and the alert was generated. 
In good visibility, runway incursions are not 
only less frequent, but are also more easily 
mitigated through visual detection by one of 
the parties involved (including the ATCO). 
Table 1. Test scenarios
#
Ownship 
state
Target state Alert generated
Expected 
pilot reaction
Visibility
(m)
1 Backtrack Taxiing in front of ownship at a 
slow closure rate
When separation is less than 
threshold and decreasing
Stop 100
2 Take-off Taxiing in front of ownship at a 
slow closure rate
On setting thrust to take-off 
setting
Abort 100
3 Lineup Approaching from behind As soon as target enters 
protected zone1
Vacate 
runway
2000
4 Take-off Lined up in front of ownship On setting thrust to take-off 
setting
Abort 200
5 Take-off Enters runway in front of ownship
when ownship speed exceeds 45kts
As soon as target enters 
protected zone1
Abort 600
6 Take-off Enters runway in front of ownship
when ownship speed exceeds 70kts
As soon as target enters 
protected zone1
Abort 400
7 Take-off Enters runway in front of ownship
when ownship speed exceeds 
108kts
As soon as target enters 
protected zone1
Abort 400
8 Take-off Crosses hold-short bars to runway 
ahead  of ownship at V1
No alert generated2 Continue 10,000
9 Landing Lined up When ownship is 
approximately 1nm from 
touchdown 
Go-around 900
10 Landing Lands ahead of ownship but fails to 
vacate runway
When ownship approaches 
runway threshold
Go-around 10,000
11 Landing Enters runway As soon as target enters 
protected zone1
Go-around 900
12 Landing Aborts take-off and stops far down 
the runway 
When ownship approaches 
runway threshold
Go-around 10,000
13 Landing Exits from the far end of the 
runway
No alert generated2 Continue 10,000
14 Landed Enters runway in front of ownship As soon as target enters 
protected zone1
Stop 500
                                                
1 The ‘protected zone’ is a zone defined by the RCAF that includes the runway and its environs.  The protected zone is 
exclusively reserved for the ownship during a take-off or landing.
2 The RCAF generates no alert when it identifies that it is preferable to continue the manoeuvre.  This is in line with the 
dark and silent cockpit concept.
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Accordingly, although radio communications 
with air traffic control were simulated to 
include other traffic, care was taken to ensure 
that pilots were unaware of conflict aircraft 
during the actual experiment.  This required the 
incursion to be caused by a simulated target 
aircraft piloting error.  
The scenarios were chosen to simulate runway 
incursions at specific moments in the take-off 
and landing manoeuvres. Accordingly, 
scenarios 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 have been designed 
with the incursion occurring at specific speeds 
ranging from start of take-off to the decision 
speed V1 (140kts). This was done because the 
implications of aborting the manoeuvre vary 
significantly along the take-off manoeuvre as 
V1 is approached and this often results in pre-
conditioned mind-sets that influence the crew’s 
decision in such circumstances.  Consequently, 
it was desirable to consider the effect of take-
off progress on the pilot’s reactions to the 
alerts.
Scenario 8 visibility is set so that the crew can 
visually detect the target aircraft crossing the 
hold-short bars and approaching the runway.  
The desired response is for the crew to continue 
the run, for in this scenario, the ownship will 
clear the conflict by continuing the take-off and 
if the run is aborted, the risk of collision 
increases.  In such circumstances the RCAF 
does not generate an alert, in line with the dark 
and silent cockpit concept.  It was desirable to 
assess pilot confidence in the RCAF by 
allowing a separate information channel (their 
vision and independent detection of the target) 
to lead them to an independent and possibly 
different conclusion.  It is also evident that this 
scenario would have no value in low visibility 
conditions as the crew would have had no 
means of otherwise detecting the conflict 
(without a moving map).
Scenarios 9 – 14 address conflicts during 
landing.  Here again, three scenarios (10, 12 
and 13) were designed with good visibility to 
allow the crew to form an independent opinion 
as they would in such circumstances.  The 
RCAF does not discriminate between good and 
low visibility conditions and therefore will 
provide alerts in either condition.  Scenarios 
10, 12 and 13 were designed to investigate how 
pilots would handle situations where an aircraft 
is still on the runway as they are approaching to 
land.  In particular, the extent to which the 
crew would continue the approach and whether 
they would either abort before the RCAF alert 
would be generated or knowingly continue 
even after an alert, is of significant interest.
Certain scenarios were chosen to test the RCAF 
at the edges of its performance envelope. 
These include high speed take-off scenarios 
(e.g. Scenario 7) and landing scenarios where 
the ownship is given a land-after instruction 
(Scenario 10). In these scenarios, the decision 
taken by the RCAF is not straightforward.  If 
an incursion occurs when the ownship is at a 
high speed during take-off, for example, the 
RCAF considers the implications of the 
continued run and aborted run cases to 
determine a preferred manoeuvre and generate 
an appropriate alert.  In landing, it is common 
for an aircraft to have minimal separation from 
the aircraft in front of it and the RCAF is 
required not to issue nuisance alerts.  Such 
conditions clearly test the capabilities of the 
RCAF concept and system and are of great 
interest to all stake-holders.  They also 
stimulate debate with participating pilots and 
support investigation into HMI, procedural and 
crew issues that may be involved in such
critical situations.
Scenarios 1 and 3 were designed to cater for 
operation at just before and after the take-off 
and landing manoeuvre.  Although not the main 
focus of the RCAF and its evaluation 
programme, these scenarios were included to 
stimulate discussion on and support the 
investigation of the value of the RCAF in these 
situations.
5.2 Conflict Simulation Software
In order to create the traffic conflict scenarios 
described in Table 1, a rapid prototyping tool 
was developed [7]. This tool consists of a 
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software package comprising three main 
blocks, namely the:
(1) Target Motion Generator: This was used to 
simulate typical targets in manoeuvres 
such as taxi, take-off and landing. 
(2) Scenario Definition and Control Unit: This 
was used to define a runway traffic conflict 
scenario.  The user can specify from a
number of variables (such as ownship 
position and speed) the condition or 
moment at which the incursion will occur.  
(3) Dynamic Target Control Unit: This feature 
enables the speed of the target to be 
dynamically controlled in response to the 
independent movement of the ownship.  In 
this way, the exact moment the runway 
incursion occurs is controlled to meet the 
specifications defined by the Scenario 
Definition and Control Unit, so that
reaction time available to the pilots in the 
event of a conflict is controlled in a 
repeatable manner.  As in each scenario 
run the pilots had complete freedom in 
aircraft handling (eg. whether they 
conducted a rolling take-off or not, etc.) 
this unit allowed each run to create the 
same conflict conditions through dynamic 
control of the target.
This tool was designed to be flexible and easy 
to use and allowed the user to create realistic 
and repeatable conflict scenarios.
6 Evaluation Procedure
6.1 Briefing
Crews were not provided with any briefing 
material prior to their arrival for the evaluation 
trials.  This strategy was selected to control the 
level of understanding of the system, as 
otherwise it would have been subject to the 
interest of the individual on the subject and his 
initiative.  The briefing session was carefully 
designed to provide an understanding of the 
operation of the alerting system that was 
typical of what is expected of competent line 
pilots, taking into account the novel aspects of 
the system.
Consequently, the briefing session carried out 
upon the pilots’ arrival at Cranfield University 
included the following:
 Welcome address and Company 
Presentations – This gave participants an 
overview of housekeeping and health and 
safety issues to consider whilst on site and 
an introduction of the universities and the 
departments involved in the RCAF 
development and evaluation.
 FLYSAFE Overview – This presentation 
provided a context to the evaluations, 
outlining the structure, activities and goals 
of FLYSAFE.
 RCAF Overview – This presentation 
focused on describing the problem of 
runway incursion, outlining the 
functionality to be evaluated and the 
rationale underlying its operating logic and 
parameters. 
 Scope of the Evaluation – Participants 
were given the aims of the evaluation as 
well as the intended methods of data 
collection and analysis.
 The Cranfield Simulator – Participants 
were given an overview of the functioning 
of the simulator prior to the opportunity to 
familiarise themselves with its operation. 
The pilots were also briefed on the 
simulated operation (departure and arrival 
at Bristol Airport) and provided with the 
relevant Bristol airfield charts, as they 
would in normal operational briefings.
6.2 Familiarisation Session
All participants had the opportunity to 
familiarise themselves with the Cranfield 
simulator after the briefing session. The aim of 
this session was to introduce the pilots to the 
simulated environment on the first day prior to 
the evaluations the next morning.
During this session the pilots operated in pairs 
as a crew and flew a number of circuits in 
various wind and visibility conditions. 
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Particular attention was given to familiarising 
them with the following:
 Cockpit layout – Since the simulator is 
mainly used for research and has a 
combination of components which are 
characteristic of Airbus and Boeing 
aircraft, type-rated crews required 
familiarisation with the cockpit 
environment and HMI.  
 Aircraft handling – Crews were given the 
opportunity to become familiar with the 
simulator’s handling qualities, particularly 
during landing.  The control column was 
used to ‘fly’ the simulator throughout the 
evaluations and this gave Airbus type-rated 
crews the opportunity to familiarise 
themselves with this method of control.  
 Reference speeds – Crews were given the 
opportunity to be briefed on key reference 
speeds (such as V1, VR and approach
speeds) and the flap-speed schedule. 
 ILS approaches in low visibility.
 Moving map display – Crews would not 
have seen the moving map prior to the 
familiarisation session.
 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) –
The pilots were told to follow standard 
procedures and radio communication with 
a pseudo-ATCO over the intercom.
During this session the RCAF was disabled and 
no conflict scenarios were simulated.  
However, the alerts they would be expected to 
hear in the event of a conflict were triggered to 
allow them to familiarise themselves with the 
specific messages, voice and tones.  The 
familiarisation session lasted for approximately 
one hour.
6.3 Experiment
Participants were required to complete all 
scenarios, avoiding the other aircraft and 
following company SOPs.  Participants 
operated in crews of two to ensure ecological 
validity, with the more senior member acting as 
the pilot in command (PIC). Where two first 
officers were working together, the pilot flying 
(PF) acted as the PIC. The 14 scenarios were 
presented to the crews in random order 
generated by the simulator. For half of the 
scenarios, the PIC acted at the PF and the other 
pilot acted as the pilot not flying (PNF). For 
the remaining scenarios, the PIC would act as 
the PNF and the other pilot would act as the 
PF.
The scenarios were divided into three main 
categories: backtrack/lineup, take-off and 
landing manoeuvres. To ensure that the 
participants were fully immersed in the 
simulation, all take-off, backtrack and lineup 
scenarios began at the ramp whereas the 
landing scenarios began at eight nautical miles 
from the runway threshold. This also provided 
the pilots with sufficient time to achieve a 
stabilised approach.  Participants were required 
to give all ATC calls as they would be expected 
to under normal operating conditions and other 
aircraft chatter was generated though the 
pseudo-ATCO to give them an opportunity to 
maintain situational awareness as they would 
do in their working environment. 
All scenarios were pre-recorded in the 
simulator so each of the crews was presented 
with the same scenarios.   However, all ATC 
and other radio communications were created 
in real-time to support live interaction with the 
ownship’s crew.  
6.4 Post-Scenario Questionnaire
After each scenario, pilots were asked a 
number of questions from a post-scenario 
questionnaire specifically designed to capture 
the reactions of the crew during and after the
scenario was conducted.  This allowed specific 
details pertaining to each scenario condition to 
be captured for later qualitative analysis.
The interviewer administered the questions and 
noted the answers, as the pilots remained seated 
in the cockpit seats for this interview.  The 
questions were of an open, semi-structured 
format to allow participants to give their views 
on the proceedings of the scenario just 
completed.  The questionnaire also used closed 
and scaled questions to allow for quantification 
and comparison.
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6.5 De-Briefing
At the end of the simulator session, participants 
were given a thorough de-brief. This gave 
participants an opportunity to reflect on the 
session, summarise their main thoughts and ask 
any final questions.  The de-briefing session 
included group discussions as well as a self-
completed questionnaire.   
6.6 Data Collection
Following each evaluation session, the data 
pertaining to each scenario was retrieved from 
the data logging device for quantitative 
analysis.
6.7 Measures
The quantitative measures taken from the 
simulator were the following: 
1. The closest point of approach (CPOA)
2. Whether a collision occurred and, if so, 
a. Ownship speed at the time of the 
collision
b. Target speed at the time of the collision
3. Time from the start of the alert to action 
effected 
a. For aborted take-off, time to zero thrust
setting
b. For go-around, time to TOGA thrust
setting
The qualitative data analysis used data 
collected in the post-scenario questionnaire and 
the de-briefing session. In order to obtain 
participants’ views on the alerting strategy, the 
directive and non-directive modes of alerting 
were discussed.  The participants were given 
the opportunity to share their experience after 
the scenarios and comment on and compare the 
perceived effectiveness of these alerting 
strategies in the scenarios experienced.
All the qualitative data was gathered by the 
same researcher to ensure consistency and
reliability in the data gathered.  The data were 
recorded and recurrent themes from the 
discussions were extracted and highlighted.
7 Conclusion
The experiment described in this paper was 
designed to meet the aims of the RCAF
evaluation programme using line pilots and 
Cranfield University’s Large Aircraft Flight 
Simulator.  Accordingly, the experiment was 
structured around 14 carefully designed 
scenarios.  Pre-evaluation briefing and 
familiarisation sessions supported the smooth 
and successful execution of these scenarios, 
with the post-scenario questionnaire, de-
briefing session and recorded data retrieved 
from the simulator providing the qualitative 
and quantitative data required for eventual 
analysis.
The broad range of conflict combinations
covered by the 14 test scenarios was designed
to enable the assessment of RCAF operation in 
conflicts typically encountered in real 
operation.  In this way, the experiment further
enabled the evaluation programme to provide 
an indication of the expected impact of the 
RCAF on runway safety.   
The experiment was used in the evaluations 
that were carried out at Cranfield University 
and the results from the evaluations provided 
sufficient material to successfully assess the 
RCAF performance and suitability in the 
cockpit.
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